Abstract
Introduction
Since 2009, Nigeria has been caught in the grip of serious acts of violence; bombings, killings and destruction of property linked to the Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram; roughly translated into ‗western education/civilisation is evil ' (Amnesty 2012, 3) . There is literature on the establishment and development of the group and the accounts (some of which are rather hazy) will not be rehashed here (Walker 2012 , Amnesty 2012 , Pham 2012 , Adesoji 2010 . Suffice it to say that the group has gained notoriety and it has engaged the Nigerian state in a running conflict on among others, the demand for an ‗Islamic State' at least in the Northern part, if not the whole of the country, and the unconditional release of its members detained by state security forces (Walker 2012, 11-12) . Some accounts attribute the group's violence to religious fanaticism or Islamic ‗revivalism'; typical of wider international narratives of terrorism (Walker 2011, 9-10) , this line of argument will not be addressed here. The official narrative, and which is relevant to the discussion that follows, hinges the violence on political opposition to the current administration based on ethnic grounds. Significantly however, relevant stakeholders, local voices at, close to, or otherwise connected to the epicentre of the violence have maintained an alternative narrative. The alternative narrative locates the violence within the context of social displacement, social neglect, abject poverty and disenchantment with government and the state. Understanding of the social context as well as the analogous experience of the country with another insurgency supports the alternative narrative.
The core argument of this article is that the neglect of basic rights, conceived here as economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) and due process by the Nigerian state have combined to foster recurring violence in different parts of the country. There is a governance gap which has led to gross discontent at the lower levels of the society. The governance gap has created fertile breeding grounds for the recruitment of disillusioned youths who are easily mobilised to violence and lately, insurgency/terrorism by demagogues of varying hue. In order to address the resulting state of insecurity and curb the propensity for the development of such groups in the future, the state and the political elite have to commit to a fundamental socio-political and legal restructuring that accords human dignity to the country's teeming population and in particular, youths, who face bleak prospects of self-actualisation.
This article is proceeds as follows. The analysis adopts the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) approach to identify and discuss the factors that have fostered and promoted violence, insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. It moves on to an examination of the context of violence and conflict in the country. It then argues for strategies that are basic rights-sensitive in addressing the untoward situation. It concludes on the note that there are normative and pragmatic reasons for the country to adopt the socio-legal policy line argued for in this article and that wider application can be found for it in resolving situations of violence and conflict in other parts of Sub-Sahara Africa, especially but developing countries in general.
Conceptual approach
It is a notorious fact that Sub-Sahara Africa has had a disproportionate share of civil strife in the last couple of decades. The discussion in this article requires identifying the actual or main causes of the current Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. A central argument of the discourse here is that analysis of violence or conflict in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, has commonly proceeded in a manner that assumes rather than discover the real or main causes of such violence or conflicts. For this purpose, I adopt a critical perspective, the analytical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) for the important task of identifying the main cause of the current insurgency in the country. The other major part of the discussion; addressing the causes of the insurgency, involves identifying appropriate mechanisms for curbing insecurity and restoring sustainable peace in the country. For this latter task, I propose a ‗Basic Rights-Sensitive Approach.'
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)
In the critical studies tradition, CTS scholars challenge orthodox accounts and mainstream scholarship on terrorism. CTS scholarship adopts empirical, normative and theoretical approaches that question the methods and arguments of mainstream practices of governments and the supporting scholarship on terrorism as conduct of sometimes mentally imbalanced individuals and groups (Stohl 2008, 7-8) (MTS) (Gunning and Jackson 2011) 2 which is the description of groups like the Boko Haram.
As a research orientation, CTS challenges the prevailing and assumed knowledge and what ‗they' do to ‗us' but the ways in which the violence ‗we' have carried out and threatened has been a negative constitutive presence in the making of world politics.
In doing so, CTS has sought to contextualise forms of global political violence within a deeper history of Western imperialism, North-South state formation and the forms of neo-imperialism, hegemony and identity politics that prevail today (2011, 1).
A CTS approach to terrorism studies provides an appropriate point of departure for interrogating the causes of violence in what is sometimes less than accurately described as ‗ethno-religious' conflicts, and in particular, the recent experience of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. This is because, as stated earlier, the official narrative on the insurgency follows at best, a MTS approach to the study of violence and terrorism. The mainstream approach, basically uncritical of conventional (official/state) accounts of terrorism, has not only failed to make the world a safer place, but has been criticised for compounding the contemporary security situation around the world (Herring and Stokes 2011). Any dubious theory on terrorism (or any aspect of society and its regulation for that matter) will have deleterious effects on counter-terrorism policy or measures (Gunning and Jackson 2011, 370) , thus the danger in an uncritical stance, especially in a terrain where until recently, terrorism was alien.
Further, a CTS approach is useful for delving behind the scenes to identify alternative or even neglected narratives which not only supplements mainstream accounts but provides a robust account of the truth about the causes and motivations of terrorist violence. This is the case because as a frame of analysis, CTS involves an ontological commitment that ‗entails an ongoing process of intellectual engagement (rather than a fixed position or endpoint) with a wide range of perspectives and approaches'. CTS not only rejects ‗universalism, essentialism, and exceptionalism in characterising terrorism,' but also seeks to ‗prioritise specificity, context, history, and nuance' in the area of terrorism studies (Jackson 2009, 4) . It thus concretely expands the scope for engagement with, and reducing the security challenges terrorism poses to society (Herring and Stokes 2011, 2).
Even more relevant to this discourse, CTS, as Jackson points out, directly addresses ‗conditions that can be seen to impel actors to resort to terrorist tactics ' (2009, 6) . This last point links up with the central concern of this article with achieving sustainable peace and security in sites of terrorist activity through an enquiry that seeks to locate major factors at the root of violence and terrorism crowded out of the conventional narratives on such experiences. This brief on CTS makes it apposite for the perspective advanced in the following discussion on the Nigerian experience of violence and terror.
A 'Basic Rights-Sensitive' approach
The desire for achieving not just a ‗victory' over terrorist groups but instituting sustainable peace in a liberal society drives the choice of argument for adopting an approach that positively diffuses the recurring tensions and violence in the country. A ‗basic rightssensitive' approach, is particularly apt for the context which as will be shown below, is one fraught with sometimes gross violations of human rights and dignity which have persisted along with institutionalised corruption in the midst of vast natural resources, including but not limited to oil and natural gas. This approach it is anticipated, should contribute significantly to instituting a system that at least substantially reduces the incidence of gross social discontent and sense of social injustice that commonly, if not invariably, underpins social violence in the nature of violent insurgence and terrorism. (Pham 2012, 7) . It is now appropriate to turn to justification of these frameworks through an exploration of the context.
Conflict and violence in Nigeria: scorecard of neglect

The governance gap
The institutionalisation of a governance gap has become common experience in many developing countries and especially in sub-Sahara Africa. The governance gap refers to a gulf that has developed between citizens and the state as a result of the lack of credible leadership and the implementation of programmes that bear little or no positive impact on the social development of the people. The governance gap leads to social disillusionment and produces large numbers of citizens who become disconnected from the state and its institutions. Such individuals slip through institutional arrangements to become easy recruits in the hands of all forms of ethnic, political and religious irredentists who challenge the state.
It is pertinent to the argument made in this article to be clear about the socio-economic and political situation in Nigeria, particularly in the context of the post-authoritarian transition from 1999 and even previous to it. The country has witnessed some of the most egregious disregard for basic rights -ESC rights and due process -during both periods. The country's experience in its post-colonial period has situated Nigerian society in a governance gap.
The multi-religious and multi-ethnic country typifies the legacy of British colonialism in subSahara Africa. The acute experience of a governance gap in the last twelve years is a resounding irony because the country had never earned more in its post-independence existence. A very recent appraisal of the country's economic performance stated that the country has achieved ‗a robust increase in GDP from 2.9 per cent in the 1990s to 8.9 per cent in the following decade.'
But poverty rates have not only increased, it has indeed continued to rise with the northern part being worst hit (Joseph 2012, 14) . The northern part of the country, following decades of social and infrastructural neglect at all levels of governance ‗has been in economic free fall.'
All around the country, inequality results in conflict (Joseph 2012, 14) .
However, as Joseph observed, analyses of insecurity and vicious cycles of violence in Africa usually fail to touch-base with the ‗underlying' causes (2012, 14) . It is logical to assume that recommendations from such ‗analyses,' lacking in positive rigour, will deliver inadequate, if not misleading policy guidance with deepening frustration for all involved. 4 While it is easy to ascribe violence in sub-Sahara Africa, and specifically in countries like Nigeria to religious revivalism, many such analyses suffer from inadequate investigation of the true causes of persisting unrest and violence on the continent; ‗discordant development' (Joseph 2012, 14) .
However, from a CTS perspective, comprehensive understanding of the context of the violence is germane to an accurate analysis of the on-going experience of insurgency that has emanated from the north-eastern part of Nigeria in particular.
Harvests of violence
Like any other social phenomenon, the contemporary experience of violence or terrorism, plays out and is located within a specific context. However, as mentioned earlier, analyses of terrorism have for too long proceeded and are dominated by neglect of context. Breen Smyth et al have observed that the current study of terrorism, occurs largely in a political, legal, cultural, and academic context…in which fascination with terrorism encourages moral panics and an excessive focus on violence, to the neglect of the wider social, historical, and often mundane milieu in which it is situated (2008, 1-2).
A desire to rectify that principal failing is one of the fundamental justifications for the emergence of CTS.
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The social context of violence and now terrorism in Nigeria is that of gross social deprivation and pauperisation in the midst of plenty. While many of the incidences of violence have been attributed to religion, this is usually obfuscation of the reality. The link to religion is mostly accidental than anything else. A nuanced analysis discloses that ethnicity plays a major role in violent incidences in the country reported as religious. This is due to the fact that for the most part, ‗ethnic boundaries' are essentially coterminous with religious identity-the Yoruba (of the south-west of the country) being the main oddity in this regard-making it more apt to talk in terms of ‗ethno-religious' conflicts in the country. Even that, as mentioned earlier, is in many cases less than accurate. In reality, beyond the façade of ethnicity and religion lies (at least in the permutations of the protagonists of such conflicts) the quest for political power and the economic control it invariably confers in the Nigerian setting (Ukiwo 2003, 120-129; Dowden 452-453, 2008) . As Walker rightly puts it, an external view may suggest that religious differences accounts for the conflicts in the country but a careful and closer look reveals that ‗politics-more precisely, control of government patronage-is the primary cause of many of these conflicts' (Walker 2012, 1). intuition suggests that such pervasive poverty and grotesque disparities breed resentment, hostility, and insecurity ' (2007, 32) .
Given the context of the
In this regard, two main lines, of many hypothetical causes of violent conflict, have been identified by research. The first line points at political repression, the other economic conditions, specifically poverty. While it is conceded that repression does engender conflict, the evidence in support of poverty as the major cause of violent conflicts is more robust; economic factors trump political ones (Miguel 2007, 55) . This is what Miguel refers to as the ‗poverty-violence nexus ' (2007, 51) . Kahl has similarly pointed out that after World War II, majority of wars leading to over 40 million deaths have been within rather than between The Governor of a major oil producing state in the Niger Delta where there has also been widespread incidence of violence and conflict by militias against the Nigerian state shares the poverty-violence nexus view. He noted that most of those involved in ‗Boko Haram-related activities' were persons mainly between the ages of 18 and 21 years. According to him, they were victims of ‗political and socio-economic violence' and who then resorted to physical violence. He emphasised that provision of free education, water, and infrastructural facilities like roads and electricity was essential to dissuade the people from resort to violence. Youths busy in education will not ‗have time to be actively involved Boko Haram activities' he reasoned (The Guardian, 26 May 2012). In order words, instituting basic rights-sensitive governance will address the discontent.
Addressing the challenge of conflict and insurgency
Imperative of instituting economic, cultural and social rights (ESC rights)
It is important to prioritise ESC rights in Nigeria. This call remains crucial in view of the fact that social, economic and cultural rights unlike civil and political rights are still non- It is relevant to mention that an institutionally conservative judiciary has helped to fossilize aspirations towards social empowerment on the basis of these provisions. The Supreme As the Arab Spring has demonstrated, securing basic rights of access to food health and shelter is no longer a matter of choice but ought to be regarded as a priority both in national jurisdictions and the international system. The highest and coordinating office for human rights in the international system, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHRC) has noted in this regard that it was the denial of ‗the most basic elements of a life in dignity' that impelled Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian to set himself alight thereby setting ‗a spark that lit the fire of the Arab Spring.' It further noted that the experience ‗exposed the fallacy of the assumption that economic or social progress can be achieved in isolation from enjoyment of human rights' (OHCHR 2011, 62) . Taking It is relevant in this regard to point out that sceptics have expressed the view that the government's amnesty programme is merely diversionary. Some consider it a ploy to diffuse the restiveness in the Niger Delta to ensure ‗business as usual' for the government and the powerful multinational oil corporations without the political will to empower the people of the region or address serious environmental degradation that has taken place (and continues)
there (Ogege 2011). Such apprehension is not completely without justification. There is the government's extremely restricted consultation with stakeholders, the rather questionable deployment of tremendous financial resources to a few ex-militants and the dubious, overnight transformation of erstwhile leaders of some militant groups to multi-millionaires (Carmody 2011, 115) . This is not to mention alleged corruption that has attended the whole process from payments for surrendered weapons, identification of ‗ex-militants,' to disbursement of stipends to them as well as fickle commitment to well-grounded socioeconomic policies by successive administrations in the country. Notwithstanding these anomalies, it is empirically ascertainable that the attacks against the state have being considerably minimised with the country now faced with taking forward a basic rights approach to the crisis in the area.
In sum, there is more than a normative argument to be made for the introduction of ESC rights in Nigeria as a veritable mechanism for combatting the rising wave of violence. The admittedly limited precedent-setting experience of introducing socio-economic measures into the options for achieving peace in the Niger Delta with positive results commends the introduction of ESC rights as an imperative for achieving sustainable peace in the country as a whole. The introduction of ESC rights is a sound approach to tackling the cycles of violence in the country and ought to be adopted as against the current practice of official denial and inimical politics of terrorism. The foregoing discussion on institutionalising ESC rights in Nigeria could be viewed as suggesting that this on its own will bring about the desirable result of diffusing the tensions that lead to insurgencies in the country. However, in light of realities in the country, such a view will be mistaken. To achieve the desired positive impact of the introduction of ESC rights in the country, there is a correlating requirement to address another feature of the governance gap earlier discussed; virtual absence of due process in governance.
Due process -curbing corruption, checking Impunity
Due process here refers to the realisation that power has the tendency to corrupt and so there is a critical need to check its exercise particularly on the part of the state. This is ensured through procedural and substantive measures. Due process constrains the application of governmental power by requiring that policies and actions of government officials are not arbitrary. The central idea of substantive due process as Fallon explains is ‗government officials must act on public spirited rather than self-interested or invidious motivations, and there must be a -rational‖ or reasonable relationship between government's ends and its means' (Fallon 1993, 95) .
The absence of ‗due process' and transparency in the conduct of government's contract and procurement activities facilitates grand theft of public funds. This led to the establishment of the ‗Due Process' Office -later Bureau for Public Procurement in the early years of the Obasanjo administration (Okonjo-Iweala 2012, 88-89) . However, the thinness of due process in the country; in its procedural form -requiring compliance with laid down rules, and substantive-that those rules themselves must be reasonable and not self-serving, transcends government's fiscal activities; it permeates all structures of governance. The focus here is however limited to two aspects; political corruption as a reflection of absence of due process and impunity in the conduct of security agencies in carrying out otherwise legitimate duties.
It is estimated that Nigeria has made over 400 billion dollars from oil exports in six decades but more than 80% of that figure has accrued to a mere 1% of the population (Carmody 2011, 113-114 There is an urgent need to curb corruption in countries like Nigeria since it is a very major predisposing factor to social violence. Pham has observed that a viable to ending incessant violence in the country requires ‗dramatic action' to end corruption and the establishment of a ‗more inclusive' government to alleviate poverty and lack of access to health care, expand access to education, and create a transportation, utilities, and communications infrastructure capable of sustaining economic growth for Nigeria's 170 million people (2012, 7) .
As mentioned above, there is also an urgent need to pursue due process through checking the impunity of the state and its agencies, especially the security forces. A key problem regarding due process in the country is the impunity of state security agents. It is important to note in this regard that extra-judicial killings by the security agencies (particularly the police and the army) deployed to ‗keep the peace' in the northern part of the country, has continued till date 
Conclusion: connecting the state to society
The foregoing discussion adopted a CTS approach to identifying and understanding the issues at the root of the recurring violence in Nigeria leading it notoriously into the contemporary capture of terrorism discourse. The CTS analytical framework discloses that the official narrative side-steps the notorious fact of the governance-gap in the country which finds acute expression in the denial of basic rights and widespread political corruption. Addressing the neglect of due process and ESC rights; adopting a rights-sensitive approach by the state, holds significant promise for a sustainable resolution of the pervasive wave of violence that has threatened the country's corporate existence.
While the transition from authoritarianism to civil democratic rule is desirable, it is far from being itself a virtue that promotes the well-being of societies in Africa. Where it simply translates to nothing more than the conduct of (multi) party elections, as has being the experience in Nigeria, it only exacerbates frustration and alienation among majority of the population. This fosters a situation in which individuals become liable to ‗being mobilised around counter-elites who exploit extant popular alienation from the state by whipping up sectarian sentiments ' (Ukiwo 2003, 120 ). An important way out from the situation of violence and terrorism in Nigeria is firstly for the state to abandon denial -it is stark that there is a grave disconnect between state and society in many African countries. Nigeria is sadly one of the most poignant representation of that in the period of its post-authoritarian transition; an irony given the expectations of a post authoritarian society.
constitutionalisation and realisation of ESC rights, there is a sound argument to be made for its expedience in the same countries that have been excused for neglecting these rights on the basis of resource constrains. It is typical to find that neglect of economic of social and cultural rights in developing countries like Nigeria commonly go hand in hand with high security spending on importation of weapons for security forces; paradoxically to secure usually elusive peace. That has gone unquestioned by the prominent players in the international system, quick to move in to help ‗secure the peace' in conflict zones in the developing countries. This has to be addressed.
The discussion above has referred to an example of socio-economic intervention which though falls short of institutionalising ESC rights suggests there is considerable value in following a rights-sensitive approach as argued above. It has been conceded that there is some justification for caution given surrounding circumstances of a varied nature. Yet, it is clear that the amnesty programme substituted state denial and counter-violence with acknowledgement and some positive response to aspects of socio-economic marginalisation of the people of the Niger Delta. While the violence in the area has not completely disappeared, the amnesty and demobilisation programme has led to substantial peace and better security there, even if only in the short term. Political will to adopt an approach that is rights sensitive as canvassed here will considerably contribute to achieving sustainable peace in the country.
While upholding the argument for the urgent need for recognising and implementing ESC rights in this way, it is important to restate that the introduction of the measure alone without the additional component of observing due process by government and its agencies will lead to a still-birth of any positive promise the measure holds. This is why the argument has been made also for the need to consider the observance of due process by the state as a component of ‗basic rights' sensitivity to which government should commit itself for resolving the rampant incidence of violence across the country.
It is relevant to conclude by noting that while the focus is on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the governance policy recommendations discussed above are relevant to the wider objective of forestalling or radically diminishing the development of insurgents of any in other parts of sub-Sahara Africa and even in any other countries with similar socio-economic and political conditions. Domestic and international policy responses to the current situation of violence and conflict in other developing countries and especially those in sub-Sahara Africa like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Mali will hopefully benefit from the foregoing analysis.
1 Andris Pielbags ‗Key Note Address by EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs to the -High-Level Forum on International Cooperation'‖ (Milan, Italy 1 October 2012). 2 Also discussing the fault lines of the differentiation in categorising so called ‗secular' as against ‗religious' terrorism arguing among others that the dichotomy is on scrutiny, a deeply problematic one to make. 3 There are reputedly over 250 ethnic groups in the country. 4 While this may seem a moot point, it is significant to note that too many such ‗analysis' form the basis of the international system's engagement across a broad range of issues; socio-economic, political and legal, among others.
